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Abstract 
This article considers whether in the „war against terrorism‟ national security is 
eroded or strengthened by weakening or removing the human rights of the 
individuals who constitute the polity. It starts with the view that national security is, at 
its most fundamental, founded upon the security and liberty of the person from 
criminal and violent acts, including terrorist attacks. Such attacks, and the individuals 
and groups who perpetrate them, constitute a grave threat to the peace and security 
of nations the world over and thus endanger the security and liberty of the individuals 
who make up their populations. Governments are therefore compelled to use the 
machinery of the state to protect the nation and the individual from these attacks. 
However, the paper is based on another, equally important, assumption. This is that 
the defence of national security requires individuals to be protected from the arbitrary 
exercise of state power even in situations where the state claims to be acting to 
protect national security and individual security against grave threats such as terrorist 
acts. The Rule of Law not only protects individuals from such an exercise of state 
power by protecting their human rights, in so doing it also protects the peace and 
security of the nation from excessive and unchecked state power. But what happens 
when the Rule of Law is overturned by governments declaring that they are 
protecting national security from the terrorist threat? Who or what is then able to 
protect the individual and the nation from the state? The paper will take up these 
important questions by considering the implications of the anti-terrorism legislation 
that has been introduced in Australia since September 2001. It will also make an 
assessment of whether Australia‟s national security has been enhanced or damaged 
by this legislation. Finally, the paper will briefly consider whether in fighting the war 
against terrorism the Rudd Labor Government, elected to office in November 2007, is 
likely to depart in any significant measure from the approach of its predecessor, the 
conservative Coalition Government led by Prime Minister John Howard.  
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Introduction 
This article will investigate whether Australia requires a new conception of national 
security that better equips it to meet the challenges it faces in the age of terror than 
the conventional conception. In the conventional view, a major challenge facing any 
government is to balance its responsibility to protect the community from terrorist 
attack with its equally important responsibility to respect individual human rights and 
uphold the rule of law. According to this view, however, sometimes the defence of 
                                                 
1
 An earlier version of this paper was presented by the author at the second Research Network for a 
Secure Australia Workshop, held at the University of Wollongong in October 2007. I am grateful to my 
colleagues Susan Dodds and Luke McNamara for helping me to clarify several of the thorny issues 
discussed in the paper. Naturally, the usual disclaimers apply.  
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national security requires human rights and the Rule of Law to be relegated to a 
much lower priority. Instead, this paper argues that a new conception of national 
security may be required which embeds human rights and the Rule of Law in national 
security. On this view, therefore, in defending national security human rights and the 
Rule of Law also have to be protected. Put another way, the protection of human 
rights and the Rule of Law is effectively the defence of national security.  
 
Focusing on two of the most important and far-reaching pieces of anti-terrorism 
legislation, the discussion will consider the exceptional measures contained in 
Australia‟s anti-terrorism legislation. These are the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation (ASIO) Act 2003 and the Anti-Terrorism Act (No. 2) 2005, referred to 
respectively as the ASIO Act and ATA (No. 2). The discussion and analysis of the 
exceptional measures will address two separate but inter-related questions: 1) Are 
the exceptional measures included in the anti-terrorism legislation necessary to 
protect Australia‟s national security in face of the terrorist threat? 2) Are there any 
protections available for the individual and society from abuse of state power when a 
government weakens the Rule of Law, thereby diluting the human, civil and political 
rights it protects, claiming that this is an essential measure to protect national 
security from the terrorist threat? The exceptional measures include removal of the 
right to remain silent, reversal of the onus of proof, and the detention in secret of non-
suspects merely for questioning.2 Moreover, the two Acts to be considered in the 
paper place tight restrictions on the disclosure of information about cases in which 
persons are held in custody by the security agencies. Under these circumstances, it 
is extremely difficult for independent legal representatives to scrutinise and monitor 
the activities of these agencies thus impeding them from exercising the right of 
habeas corpus on behalf of detained persons. They are also prevented from 
mounting media and advocacy campaigns around such cases. The former 
Conservative Government steadfastly maintained that the exceptional measures 
provided the Government and national security authorities, including the Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) and the Australian Federal Police, with 
essential powers for effectively meeting and neutralising terrorist threats.3  
 
                                                 
2
 Mark Rix, „Australia‟s Anti-Terrorism Legislation: The National Security State and the Community Legal 
Sector‟, Prometheus, 24(4) (2006) pp. 429-440. 
3
 See, for example, Philip Ruddock, „Australia‟s Legislative Response to the Ongoing Threat of 
Terrorism‟, University of New South Wales Law Journal, 27(2) (2004) pp. 254-261 and Ruddock, 
„Government Enhances Anti-Terrorism Bill (No. 2) 2005‟ (2005) Media Release 222/205 1
st
 December. 
Available at:  
 http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/MinisterRuddockHome.nsf/Page/Media_Releases (accessed 20 
January 2007). 
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1 Australia’s National Security, the Terrorist Threat and Human 
Rights 
Two fundamental assumptions underpin this debate. First is the view that national 
security is founded upon the security and liberty of the person from criminal and 
violent acts, including terrorist attacks. This puts a heavy responsibility on the state, 
and the government administering it, to take effective measures to protect people, as 
individuals and as members of social and economic groupings, from threats and acts 
of this nature. Working from this basic assumption, governments are compelled to 
use the machinery of the state, and the law and legal system framing it, to take 
measures to protect individuals, the social and economic infrastructure of society, 
and the state itself from attacks mounted by terrorist organisations and individuals. 
However, the second underlying assumption is that the defence of national security 
requires individuals to be protected from the arbitrary exercise and abuse of state 
power even in situations where a government claims to be acting to protect national 
and individual security from the threat of terrorism. On this view, the Rule of Law not 
only protects the individual from the state, but in so doing it also protects the security 
and freedom of the nation from state repression. In the words of former President of 
the Israeli Supreme Court, Aharon Barak, „there is no security without law. Satisfying 
the provisions of the law is an aspect of national security.‟4 Legislation which does 
not respect the Rule of Law and the human and other rights it protects cannot 
credibly claim to be able to offer an effective defence of the individual or the nation 
against threats and attacks by terrorists who have nothing but contempt for these 
rights and for the rule of law itself. As Martin Scheinin, the UN Special Rapporteur on 
the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while 
countering terrorism, asserts in his study of Australia‟s record of human rights 
compliance in the war against terrorism: 
States have a duty to protect their societies and to take effective measures to 
combat terrorism. States are also obliged, by reason of their international 
obligations and as emphasized in various documents of the United Nations, 
including resolutions of the Security Council, to counter terrorism in a manner 
that is consistent with international human rights law. As stated in the United 
Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (part IV) effective counter-
terrorism measures and the protection of human rights are not conflicting 
goals, but complementary and mutually reinforcing ones. The defence of 
human rights is essential to the fulfilment of all aspects of a global counter-
terrorism strategy.5  
                                                 
4
 Aharon Barak J cited in Michael Kirby J, „Terrorism and the Democratic Response 2004‟, University of 
New South Wales Law Journal, 28(1) (2005) p. 328 
5 Martin Scheinin, „Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism. Australia: Study on Human Rights Compliance 
While Countering Terrorism‟, (2006). Available at:  
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Former Attorney-General Philip Ruddock, in his 2004 paper „Australia‟s Legislative 
Response to the Ongoing Threat of Terrorism‟, seemed to be in agreement with the 
sentiments expressed by the Special Rapporteur  when he asserted that the focus of 
measures to combat terrorism should be on „creating “human security” legislation that 
protects both national security and civil liberties.‟6 Recognising that „the tightening of 
security will have some effect on certain rights‟, he assured his readers that „it is our 
duty to ensure that we employ measures to minimise the impact of counter-terrorism 
laws on human rights.‟ Ruddock also responded to criticisms that the Government‟s 
anti-terrorism „efforts‟ had failed „to adequately protect our civil liberties.‟ While these 
criticisms were based „on the false assumption that counter-terrorism legislation is 
inevitably at odds with the protection of fundamental human rights‟, Ruddock did 
nevertheless have to admit that „the Government has sometimes compromised on 
these points to achieve the overriding goal of enacting new laws to combat 
terrorism.‟7 Here, Ruddock was considerably at odds with the sentiments of the 
Special Rapporteur. 
 
Since September 11, 2001 there has been a substantial increase in the volume of 
Australia‟s anti-terrorism legislation. During its hearing into Australia‟s anti-terrorism 
laws, the Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights 
of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) remarked that its attention had been 
„drawn to the large number of laws enacted since 2002 as part of Australia‟s strategy 
to counter terrorism.‟8 In an earlier publication, ICJ Australia had pointed out that „as 
at September 11, 2001, there was in place a patchwork of some 35 pieces of 
Commonwealth legislation in Australia relating to terrorism, dealing with issues 
including air navigation, police powers, chemical and biological weapons, criminal 
offences, hostages, immigration, border protection, intelligence, nuclear non-
proliferation, proceeds of crime, telecommunications, and weapons of mass 
destruction.‟9 Justice of the High Court of Australia, Michael Kirby, also called 
attention to the fact that since the attacks of September 2001 „17 items of legislation 
                                                                                                                                            
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G06/155/49/PDF/G0615549.pdf?OpenElement (accessed 3 
March 2007). A number of the relevant Security Council resolutions are briefly considered in the 
following section of the paper.  
6
 Ruddock, „Australia‟s Legislative Response‟, p. 254. 
7
ibid, pp.254-5. 
8
 EJP, „Eminent Jurists Panel concludes Australia hearing on counter-terrorism law, practices and 
policies: Press Release‟ (2006) 17
th
 March. Available at: http://www.icj-aust.org.au/  (accessed 20 March 
2007).  
9
 ICJ Australia, „Human Rights and Terrorism: Legislative and Policy Responses to Terrorism Post 
September 11 in Australia‟, ICJ Biennial Conference (2004) 27
th
-29
th
 August. Available at: http://www.icj-
aust.org.au/ (accessed 18 March 2007). 
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restricting civil freedoms have been adopted by the federal Parliament‟ with 
complementary State legislation also being passed.10 
 
According to the Eminent Jurists Panel, Australia is widely regarded and admired „as 
a country with longstanding democratic practices‟ in which „the independence of the 
judiciary, respect for the rule of law, the rights of the accused and an accountable 
justice system are well established.‟ It also noted that both civil society and the media 
are „active and vibrant‟. Taken together all these factors „provide an important 
protection against the arbitrary use of powers‟ by the state and its agencies.11 
However, the Panel also sounded a note of caution: 
Members of civil society and the legal community questioned whether many 
of the new laws were indeed required. They stressed the need to 
complement counter-terrorism laws with the ability to effectively test them in 
court for compliance with international human rights standards. Concerns 
were raised regarding provisions that have introduced broadly defined 
offences, allowed retrospective application of the law, expanded powers of 
the executive branch of government and constrained avenues of judicial 
review and due process of law.12 
 
A number of the issues raised will be considered below in the discussion of the 
exceptional measures that are included in the ASIO Act and the ATA Act (No. 2). 
These exceptional measures include the executive proscription power and the 
detention in secret of non-suspects merely for questioning and intelligence-gathering 
purposes.  
 
2 Australia’s Anti-terrorism Legislation: Review and Reality 
Like the Eminent Jurists Panel, Martin Sheinin, the UN Special Rapporteur, 
acknowledged that the need for legislative reform since 11 September 11 2001 had 
been questioned by „many from civil society‟. But, as he also pointed out, while the 
then Australian Government itself had acknowledged in a report to the UN Counter-
Terrorism Committee in 2003 that the pre-2001 legislative framework for counter-
terrorism was adequate and comprehensive, after all, as at September 11 2001, 
there were already 35 pieces of terrorism-related legislation on the statute books, 
there had nevertheless been a need to bring the existing legislation into line with UN 
Security Council Resolution 1373. This resolution calls on States to prevent and 
suppress activities aimed at the financing of terrorism and to criminalise providing or 
collecting funds to finance acts of terrorism. There had also been a need to comply 
                                                 
10
 Kirby, „Terrorism‟, p. 226. 
11
 EJP, Press Release, p. 1. 
12
 Ibid, p. 2. 
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with the work of the UN Security Council Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee 
established by UN Security Council Resolution 1267 in 1999. This Committee, 
amongst other things, maintains and constantly updates (based on information 
provided by member states) consolidated lists of individuals and groups belonging to 
or associated with Al-Qaida and the Taliban. Under Resolution 1267 all States are 
obliged „to freeze the assets, prevent the entry into or the transit through their 
territories, and prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale and transfer of arms and 
military equipment, technical advice, assistance or training related to military 
activities, with regard to the individuals and entities included on the Consolidated 
List.‟13 
 
The Special Rapporteur also referred to the 2006 Report of the Security Legislation 
Review Committee (SLRC) in his report. He noted that the SLRC „was satisfied that 
separate security legislation, in addition to the general criminal law, was necessary in 
Australia.‟14 However, unfortunately the Special Rapporteur did not mention several 
aspects of the SLCR report which should have been taken as significant and far-
reaching caveats on the SLRC‟s views regarding the necessity for separate and 
additional security legislation (several of these same caveats, and for similar 
reasons, apply to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security‟s 
2006 Review of Security and Counter Terrorism Legislation).15 These caveats reveal 
the considerable difficulties in fully protecting the human rights of Australians in the 
absence of a Bill or Charter of Rights. They also demonstrate that such an 
instrument would play an important role in opening up the Australian Government 
and the law enforcement and security agencies to greater public scrutiny by making 
them subject to a more effective and transparent accountability regime. Before 
considering the report in some detail, some background information on the SLRC 
and the legislation it reviewed is required.  
 
The independent Security Legislation Review Committee was established by the 
then Federal Attorney-General on 12 October 2005 with the Honourable Simon 
Sheller AO QC appointed as Chairman (thus, the Committee was known as the 
Sheller Committee). The Committee was composed of major stakeholders including 
                                                 
13
 UN, „The Consolidated List established and maintained by the 1267 Committee with respect to Al 
Qaida, Usama Bin Laden, and the Taliban and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities 
associated with them‟ (n.d.) Available at: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/consolist.shtml.) 
(accessed 21 March 2007 and subsequently for updates). 
14
 Scheinin, „Report of the Special Rapporteur‟, p. 4. 
15
 PJC IS, „Review of Security and Counter Terrorism Legislation‟ (2006). Available at: 
http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/pjcis/securityleg/report/report.pdf (accessed 21 March 2007). 
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the Inspector-General of Security and Intelligence, the Privacy Commissioner, the 
Human Rights Commissioner, the Commonwealth Ombudsman and a representative 
of the Law Council of Australia. The latter is the peak national body of the legal 
profession in Australia, providing national representation for the tens of thousands of 
lawyers belonging to state and territory based bar associations and law societies. 
The Committee conducted a public inquiry which received nearly 30 submissions 
and took evidence from 18 witnesses during hearings in Melbourne, Sydney, 
Canberra and Perth. It reported to the Attorney-General on 21 April 2006 who tabled 
its report in the Parliament on 15 June 2006.  
 
The SLRC was established pursuant to section 4(1) Security Legislation Amendment 
(Terrorism) Act 2002 as amended by the Criminal Code Amendment (Terrorism) Act 
2003. Under Section 4(1) the Attorney-General is required to review „the operation, 
effectiveness and implications‟ of the amendments made by the Act itself, the 
Suppression of Financing of Terrorism Act 2002, Criminal Code Amendment 
(Suppression of Terrorist Bombings) Act 2002, Border Security Legislation 
Amendment Act 2002, Telecommunications Interception Legislation Amendment Act 
2002 and Criminal Code Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002.16 Here is the first major 
caveat on the SLRC report. The SLRC was established to review the operation, 
effectiveness and implications of the anti-terrorism legislation enacted in 2002 and 
2003, not the subsequent and even more far-reaching legislation, in particular, the 
ASIO Act and ATA (No. 2) which will be considered below. The task of reviewing 
amending legislation was made even more difficult for the SLRC because, since the 
enactment of the six amending Acts it was mandated to review „the several 
amendments they made to other legislation, such as the Criminal Code Act 1995 
(Criminal Code), were later further amended.‟17 This is a second caveat on the SLRC 
report, for the complexity and confusion created by the use of amending legislation 
was a defining feature of the manner in which the former Government pushed its 
anti-terrorism legislation through both houses of the Federal Parliament. This 
involved, amongst other things, 
the use of sprawling, omnibus legislation by which multiple Acts are amended 
in a complex web of interlocking changes within a single amendment Bill, 
which makes extensive debate and parliamentary supervision difficult; an 
absence of appropriately argued justification for such significant changes; 
                                                 
16
 SLRC, „Report of the Security Legislation Review Committee‟ (2006) June. Available at: 
http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(03995EABC73F94816C2AF4AA2645824B)~SLRC+
Report-+Version+for+15+June+2006[1].pdf/$file/SLRC+Report-+Version+for+15+June+2006[1].pdf 
(accessed 20 March 2007). 
17
Ibid, p. 17. 
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minimal time for consideration of the legislation by parliamentary committees; 
and, finally, a determination on the part of the Government to implement its 
original proposals in the face of parliamentary and community concerns.18 
 
It is interesting that the SLRC did comment on the limited time available to it for 
review of the legislation. As well as being granted only six months to conduct the 
review (covering, as it pointedly noted, the Christmas/New Year and Easter holiday 
periods) the Committee had difficulty in reviewing the operation, effectiveness and 
implications of the „significant amendments‟ to the relevant legislation because it was 
required to do so very soon after they had come into effect. Together, these can be 
taken as a third caveat, for the Committee had very little opportunity to conduct the 
comprehensive and far-reaching review that was required to ensure that fundamental 
human rights and the Rule of Law were being safeguarded in the legislation.  
 
In addition to the above, a fourth caveat; the Committee was concerned with the 
perplexing and significant issue of which version of the legislative amendments 
should have been subject to review. It sought the advice of the Australian 
Government Solicitor as to whether its examination should be confined to the original 
text of the amending Acts or broadened to include the amendments contained in 
other legislation that had been created by the original legislation. Mr Henry 
Burmester QC, Chief General Counsel of the Australian Government Solicitor 
advised in this regard that „so long as the review examined the original amendments 
(in the sense of noting that they had been replaced or amended), it could not be 
criticised if it took the sensible decision to review the current form of those 
amendments.‟19 The Committee agreed that this would be a „sensible‟ course of 
action for it to take but was nevertheless concerned that it would only exacerbate the 
considerable difficulties it already faced in fulfilling its mandate of reviewing the 
operation, effectiveness and implications of the specified amending legislation. There 
were two major issues here which together constitute a fifth caveat on its report. 
First, the Committee did not have access to information about the way in which the 
law enforcement and security agencies had used the legislation or how the relevant 
provisions had been interpreted and applied by the courts. Second, and perhaps 
more significantly, the SLRC had not „itself received confidential briefings about the 
                                                 
18
 Jenny Hocking, „Protecting Democracy by Preserving Justice: “Even for the Feared and Hated”‟, 
University of New South Wales Law Journal, 27(2) (2004) p. 322. 
19
 SLRC, „Report‟, p. 18. 
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level of threat of terrorist activity currently faced by Australia‟.20 This, however, was 
an issue on which the Committee undertook to elaborate in its report.  
 
It did so, but only very obliquely, in the already cited comments about the difficulties 
associated with reviewing not only amending legislation but also subsequent 
amendments to the amending legislation. And it did so again in its remarks on the 
limited amount of time that it had been granted to review the operation, effectiveness 
and implications of this complex web of amending legislation so soon after its 
enactment. While these comments are interesting and valuable in their own right, 
they do not address the more fundamental concern with the secrecy surrounding the 
level of terrorist threat faced by Australia and whether therefore the anti-terrorism 
legislation provides the Government, and the law enforcement and security agencies 
it directs, with the resources and means adequate to meet the threat. In other words, 
the Committee‟s comments tell us next to nothing about whether the legislation taken 
as a complete package is actually necessary to protect Australia‟s national security 
from the threat of terrorism or even the precise nature of that threat.  
 
The SLRC also expressed some misgivings about the ASIO Act 2003, but only to 
point out that its terms of reference prevented it from considering in detail the 
exceptional measures contained in that legislation. It was noted above that the SLRC 
was established under section 4(1) Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 
2002 (SLAT) which is headed „Public and independent review of the operation of 
Security Acts relating to terrorism‟. However, as the SLRC pointed out in its report 
„Section 4 of the SLAT Act does not refer to what are arguably the most controversial 
aspects of the security legislation found in Division 3 of Part 3 of the Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (the ASIO Act) as currently amended, 
and in Divisions 104, „Control orders‟ and 105, „Preventative detention orders‟ of Part 
5.3 of the Criminal Code.‟21 These are some of the exceptional measures that will be 
considered in the next section. For clarification, the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003 amended the ASIO Act 
1979. In essence, the amendments enable ASIO to obtain a warrant to detain and 
question persons (who do not themselves have to be suspected of terrorism 
offences) in order to gather intelligence related to terrorist activity. This ASIO Act was 
further amended in the same year by the ASIO Legislation Amendment Act 2003 to 
                                                 
20
ibid, p. 3. 
21
 Ibid, p. 22. 
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ensure that in planning and executing warrants ASIO has the ability to collect 
intelligence and information that it regards as necessary to prevent a terrorist act.  
 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) Act 
The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) 
Act 2003 (the ASIO Act) that was introduced into Parliament in 2003 was the 
outcome of a lengthy process of community consultation, inquiries conducted by 
several parliamentary committees including the Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
ASIO, Australia Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) and Australia Defence Signals 
Directorate DSD (renamed the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and 
Security in late 2005), and wider Parliamentary debate. Some minor improvements 
were made to the Bill‟s original harsh provisions such as those allowing for 
incommunicado detention, executive proscription and preventing independent legal 
representation for suspects during detention. But the Government‟s earlier failure to 
gain full Parliamentary endorsement of some of the harsher measures it had 
proposed for inclusion in the SLAT Act, in particular the proscription power, appears 
to have strengthened its resolve. When first introduced by the Government into 
Parliament, the SLAT Act had contained provisions enabling the Executive to 
proscribe so-called „terrorist organisations‟ by allowing the Minister (Attorney-
General) to issue just such a proscription on his own authority. After community 
consultation and parliamentary review a compromise was reached whereby „an 
attenuated form of the power [of proscription] was introduced which allowed provision 
for the proscription of organizations listed by the United Nations as “terrorist 
organisations” [on the Consolidated List].‟22 As Hocking notes, however, the 
Government effectively circumvented the Parliament and challenged its authority by 
including the power of ministerial (or, executive) proscription in the Criminal Code 
Amendment (Terrorist Organisations) Act 2004. But even before this, „in late 2003, 
the Government introduced further amendments to the newly empowered ASIO Act, 
seeking stringent secrecy provisions in relation to public disclosure of the 
implementation of its detention regime and still further expanded interrogation 
powers‟ including the doubling of the questioning period to 48 hours if an interpreter 
had been present at any stage of the interrogation.23 
 
The ASIO Act gives ASIO the power „to obtain a warrant to detain and question a 
person who may have information important to the gathering of intelligence in 
                                                 
22
 Hocking, „Protecting Democracy‟, p. 321. 
23
Ibid‟, p. 328. 
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relation to terrorist activity.‟24 The Act defines a warrant „issuing authority‟ as a 
person appointed by the Minister, who can be a federal magistrate or judge or 
„another class of people nominated in regulations‟.25 As Christopher Michaelson 
points out, this Act empowers ASIO to „detain people without judicial warrant for up 
to seven days and interrogate them for up to 24 hours (if no interpreter is present) 
within that seven-day period.‟26 Thus, persons can be detained without charge, and 
do not even have to be suspected of having committed any offence to be taken into 
custody. While being interrogated, a detainee has to answer all questions and 
provide all the information or material requested of them. A detainee also has to 
prove that they do not have the material requested. If the detainee is unable to do so 
and does not provide the material they can be imprisoned for up to five years. These 
special detention and questioning powers granted to ASIO had, as noted above, 
initially been part of the SLAT Act. The SLRC Report notes that the inclusion of these 
provisions in the ASIO Act „generated extensive debate‟ which was „in part‟ about 
„detention for seven days, removal of the right to silence, some restrictions on access 
to legal representation, secrecy of interrogation and the extension of the system to 
non-suspects.‟27 After reviewing ASIO‟s questioning and detention powers in 2005, 
the Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD recommended that they 
be continued beyond the sunset period of July 2006 subject to certain conditions. 
The Joint Committee will review the powers again in 10 years.28 In the meantime, the 
continuation of ASIO‟s questioning and detention powers has been confirmed in the 
ASIO Legislation Amendment Bill 2006.  
 
In addition to the above, the ASIO Act specifies that a „prescribed authority‟ who 
watches over a person held in detention for questioning should be a federal 
magistrate or a member of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The AAT, 
however, cannot be treated as a judicial body. Instead, the International Commission 
of Jurists Australia regards the AAT as a „quasi-judicial body‟ which lacks the full 
independence of the judiciary. This is because, with the exception of its presidential 
                                                 
24
 Australian Laws to Combat Terrorism (n.d.). Available at: 
http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/agd/www/nationalsecurity.nsf/AllDocs/826190776D49EA90CA256FA
B001BA5EA?OpenDocument (accessed 19 October 2006 and subsequently). 
25
 Christopher Michaelson, „Antiterrorism Legislation in Australia: A Proportionate Response to the 
Terrorist Threat?‟, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (28) (2005) p. 326.  
26
 Christopher Michaelson, „Security Against Terrorism: Individual Right or State Purpose?‟, Public Law 
Review, (16) (2005) p. 178. 
27
 SLRC, „Report‟, p. 22; see also Michaelson, „Security Against Terrorism‟ pp. 178-18. 
28 PJC ASIO, ASIS and DSD, „Review of Division 3 Part III of the ASIO Act 1979—Questioning and 
Detention Powers‟ (2005). Available at:  
http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/pjcaad/asio_ques_detention/fullreport.pdf (accessed 29 
January 2007). 
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members, the members of the AAT are appointed for fixed periods and are therefore 
„dependent on the favour of the executive if they wish to be reappointed‟.29 It is 
inferior in this respect to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) that 
was established in Britain in the wake of the European Court of Human Rights ruling 
in Chalal v. United Kingdom 1996.30 The AAT is rather more similar to the British 
„three wise men‟ body that was superseded by SIAC. In the Chalal case, the ECHR 
ruled that the non-judicial body known as the „three wise men‟, which up to then had 
reviewed decisions of the Home Secretary to remove people from Britain whose 
presence was regarded as „not being conducive to the public good‟ for reasons of 
national security, was in contravention of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.31 Furthermore, notes Michaelson, „the “prescribed authority” as established in 
the ASIO Act cannot be considered a “court” or “officer authorized by law to exercise 
judicial power” within the meaning of Articles 9(3) and 9(4) of the ICCPR 
[International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights].‟32 
 
Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) (No. 2) 
The Anti-Terrorism Act (No. 2) 2005 was passed into law in December 2005. The 
„key features‟ of ATA (No. 2) include: 
 a regime that will enable courts to place controls on persons who pose a 
terrorist risk to the community 
 arrangements to provide for the detention of a person for up to 48 hours to 
prevent an imminent terrorist attack or preserve evidence of a recent attack 
 an extension of the stop, question and search powers of the Australian 
Federal Police (AFP) 
 powers to obtain information and documents designed to enhance the 
AFP‟s ability to prevent and respond effectively to terrorist attack.33 
In issuing a control order a court can impose conditions on an individual including a 
requirement that the person wear a tracking device, a prohibition or restriction on the 
person talking to other people including their lawyer, and a prohibition or restriction 
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on the use of a telephone or the internet by the person.34 As for preventative 
detention, the police can detain without charge a person who they suspect will carry 
out an imminent terrorist act or is planning to carry out such an act. They can also 
hold someone who they suspect „has a “thing” that will be used in an imminent 
terrorist act.‟35 The Act allows for a person subject to a control order to be informed of 
why the restrictions were imposed. However, this „would not require the disclosure of 
any information that is likely to prejudice national security, be protected by public 
interest immunity, put at risk ongoing law enforcement or intelligence operations or 
the safety of the community‟ with similar conditions applying to an AFP request for 
variation of a control order.36 
 
ATA (No. 2) also includes an „updated‟ sedition offence „to cover those who urge 
violence or assistance to Australia‟s enemies.‟37 Commenting on this offence, George 
Williams, Director Gilbert and Tobin Centre for Public Law, University of New South 
Wales  points out that „it punishes people with up to seven years‟ jail not for what 
they do, but for what they say, such as if they urge another person to forcibly 
overthrow the constitution or government.‟38 It includes sweeping bans on free 
speech and expression and allows for very few defences against the charge of 
sedition. Williams regards it as one of „worst examples of law-making in the history of 
the Federal Parliament‟ and almost without precedent in that „it is hard to think of 
another example where a law targeting something as fundamental as free speech 
has been enacted as quickly with as many people from all sides of politics 
recognising that it needed to be amended even as it was being enacted.‟39 Chris 
Connolly  remarks that, with the exception of Australia, „no modern democratic nation 
has used sedition provisions for 50 years.‟40 Countries that have repealed sedition 
laws, or which are in the process of doing so, include Canada, Ireland, Kenya, New 
Zealand, South Africa, Taiwan, and the United States. In introducing sedition laws, 
Australia joins China, Cuba, Malaysia, North Korea, Singapore, Syria, and 
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Zimbabwe.41 In response to such criticisms, the then Attorney-General requested the 
Australian Law Reform Commission to conduct a „detailed review‟ of the crime of 
sedition. In May 2006, the Commission released its Discussion Paper 71 „Review of 
Sedition Laws‟ which called for the removal of the term „sedition‟ from the Federal 
statute books and a redrafting of the offences relating to urging force or violence 
against the government or groups in the community.42 This recommendation was 
rejected by the former Government.  
 
3 Australia, the War on Terror and Human Rights Protection 
Why has Australia‟s anti-terrorism legislation failed to provide human rights 
safeguards and why has it with so little inhibition been allowed to subvert the rule of 
law? Although Australia is a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), for example, its anti-terrorism legislation, such as the ASIO 
Act and ATA (No. 2), does not conform with its human rights obligations including 
those under Article 9 which prohibits arbitrary arrest or detention and under Article 14 
on due process of law.43 As the SLRC blandly acknowledged in an unintended 
response to the question at the opening of this section „Australia has no formal 
Charter of Human Rights.‟44 Such an instrument would serve as a standard against 
which to assess the validity of anti-terrorism legislation and other legislation 
impinging on human rights. It would, for example, have allowed the Security 
Legislation Review Committee to be more adventurous in its analysis and critique, 
and to be more courageous in formulating the recommendations it provided arising 
from its review of the anti-terrorism legislation. The UN Special Rapporteur has 
expressed his concern that „Australia does not have domestic human rights 
legislation capable of guarding against undue limits being placed upon the rights and 
freedoms of individuals.‟45 While he acknowledges that the „Government of Australia 
points to a robust constitutional structure and framework of legislation capable of 
protecting human rights and prohibiting discrimination‟ the absence of domestic 
human rights legislation „is an outstanding matter that has been previously raised by 
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the Human Rights Committee in its observations on Australia‟s reports under the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.‟46 
 
According to George Williams, for many countries with a written constitution like 
Australia, 
constitutional development in the second half of the 20th century was dominated 
by concepts of human rights...Canada and South Africa gained Bills of Rights 
while the United States saw an existing Bill of Rights expanded through judicial 
interpretation.47  
 
In countries such as New Zealand and the United Kingdom that do not have a written 
constitution „international human rights standards were incorporated into domestic 
law through statutory Bills of Rights.‟48 Though in the case of the United Kingdom the 
incorporating Human Rights Act 1998 did not come into force until 2000. The 
Eminent Jurists Panel has pointed out that Australia has yet to enact federal 
legislation incorporating international standards into national law, a move which 
„would help to establish a clear human rights framework based on international 
standards‟.49 For Amnesty International Australia (AIA), these standards „constitute 
the bare minimum necessary to protect the safety and integrity of individuals from 
abuse of power.‟50 Greg Carne points out that UN human rights bodies, such as the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Commission of Human Rights, the 
Secretary-General, the Secretary-General‟s Policy Working Group on the United 
Nations and Terrorism, amongst many others, have long advocated a „more holistic 
approach‟ to human rights to ensure that measures to counter terrorism are 
consistent with human rights values and the obligations they entail.51 Australia also is 
not a party to binding international human rights instruments. A good example of 
such an instrument, even if it is not directly applicable in the Australian context, is the 
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European Convention on Human Rights (and its five protocols) to which many 
European countries are party the United Kingdom included. The Convention enables 
the citizens of European countries to appeal to the European Court of Human Rights 
and seek redress if they believe that the laws of their own countries are in breach of 
the Convention (just as in the Chalal case cited above).52 
 
As seen above in the examination of the Security Legislation Review Committee‟s 
review of Australia‟s anti-terrorism legislation, it is hard to gauge whether the 
legislation has been effective in protecting Australia from terrorist attack. Indeed, for 
those many Australians who are not members of the Federal Cabinet or the law 
enforcement agencies and security services it is an unanswerable question. This is 
because of the secrecy surrounding the issues of whether Australia currently faces a 
terrorist threat and, if so, the nature and imminence of that threat. In view of this 
secrecy, little can therefore be said in an informed or sensible way about any terrorist 
threat that Australia may face in the future. It is thus almost impossible to determine 
whether the legislation is actually required to protect Australia‟s national security now 
or into the future from the threat of terrorism. This is more than a little unsettling in 
the light of claims made by US President Bush and his allies, including the former 
Howard Government, that the „war on terror‟ or „war against terrorism‟ will either be of 
„uncertain duration‟ or „go for years‟.53 This means that counter-terrorism measures, 
like the exceptional provisions included in Australia‟s anti-terrorism legislation, could 
also be of uncertain duration or endure for years. To be sure, national security is 
conventionally and rightly regarded as being based upon the security and liberty of 
the person from criminal and violent attacks, including terrorist acts. But, beyond this, 
the conventional view also holds that there are times when the protection of national 
security requires human rights and the Rule of Law to be given a lower priority. This 
gives rise to a significant shortcoming with this view of national security, namely, its 
strong tendency to relegate the security and liberty of the person to a secondary 
consideration after state security.  
 
If the volume of anti-terrorism legislation introduced and the measures included in it 
are anything to go by, then the former Australian Government was certainly not 
backward in using the machinery of the state to protect the country and its people 
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from the threat of terrorism (whatever the actual nature of that threat happens to be). 
It was also not backward in privileging state security over human rights and the rule 
of law. Indeed, in these respects its diligence is to be commended. But, if national 
security is also regarded as being just as fundamentally based on the security and 
liberty of the person from the arbitrary exercise or abuse of state power then the 
legislation would appear to be an abject failure. In the war on terror, as in any other 
armed conflict or type of war, national security cannot be fully protected by giving 
priority either to the security and liberty of the person from terrorist attacks or from 
the arbitrary exercise or abuse of state power. For, these are two indivisible and 
absolutely equal aspects of national security. Legislation such as Australia‟s anti-
terrorism laws, therefore, which does not respect the Rule of Law and the human and 
other rights it protects cannot credibly claim to be able to offer an effective defence of 
the individual or the nation against threats and attacks by terrorists who have nothing 
but contempt for these rights and for the rule of law.  
 
4 The Rudd Labor Government, the War against Terrorism and 
National Security 
On 22 February 2008, the new Government (elected November 2007 and led by 
Prime Minister Kevin Rudd) announced that a comprehensive review would be 
undertaken of arrangements for homeland and border security in Australia. According 
to the Prime Minister, the review confirms the new Government‟s commitment to 
conduct an assessment of whether there is a need for change to Australia‟s current 
homeland and border security regime. Ranging across the roles and functions of all 
Federal departments and agencies having responsibility for homeland and border 
security, the review will consider the changes required „to optimise the coordination 
and effectiveness of our [Australia‟s] homeland and border security efforts.‟54 The 
Review is due to report by the end of June 2008.  
 
The above announcement seems to suggest that the Homeland and Border Security 
Review will in some measure honour a commitment made in late 2007 by the then 
Shadow Minister for Homeland Security, Arch Bevis. Bevis stated that a Rudd Labor 
Government would produce a Counter Terrorism White Paper shortly after coming 
into office (neither the Rudd Cabinet nor outer ministry includes a Minister for 
Homeland Security or Arch Bevis; the new portfolio of Minister for Home Affairs falls 
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within the Attorney-General‟s purview). The White Paper was to have assessed the 
terrorist threat faced by Australia and developed a blue print for a whole-of-
government response to that threat. In announcing that a White Paper would be 
produced by a Rudd Government, Bevis observed that six years after the September 
11 terrorist attacks Australia still lacked „a clear, comprehensive statement of the 
threat presented by various terrorist organisations and their sponsors together with a 
clearly enunciated blue print in response.‟55 The White Paper was to have been 
accompanied by an unclassified version with the dual aims of better informing the 
Australian public about the nature of the terrorist threat faced by the country and 
contributing to a more informed and rational public debate about the terrorist threat 
and how best to respond to it. Being better informed and having a more „realistic‟ 
view of the threat, the Australian people would more be likely to support the „often 
controversial‟ counter terrorism measures which a government was often compelled 
to adopt. The 2008 announcement of the homeland and border security review does 
not include a commitment to produce an unclassified version. It also made no 
mention of a White Paper. As for anti-terrorism legislation and the controversial 
measures it contains, according to Bevis „strong anti-terrorism laws‟ are needed but 
so also is getting „the balance right‟. These laws therefore should „enjoy broad 
community support‟, „effectively target the terrorists‟ and „not undermine the very 
freedoms we all seek to defend.‟56 
 
Some of these themes were taken up by Robert McLelland, the new Attorney-
General, in a speech to the Security in Government Conference held in Canberra in 
December 2007 (this conference has been held annually since 2004). The change in 
Government presented an opportunity to introduce a new approach to national 
security, including the adoption of a broader perspective on the terrorist threat. This 
new approach would, like the old, include „hard intelligence and law enforcement‟. 
But, in addition, „steps to promote greater inclusiveness and opportunity‟ would be 
important elements.57 In calling for greater inclusiveness and opportunity, McLelland 
observed that „a terrorist threat in Australia has as much prospect of emanating from 
a disgruntled and alienated Australian youth as it does from the awakening of a 
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sleeper cell planted by an overseas terrorist organisation.‟ Fighting terror thus not 
only required „determination‟, it also required just as surely an approach which 
promoted „justice, the rule of law, genuine peace and inclusive development.‟58  
 
There are some hopeful even if still faint signs in these views of the former Shadow 
Minister for Homeland Security and the new Attorney-General. Certainly they appear 
to be somewhat at odds with the views and comments of the former Opposition 
Leader Kim Beazley who in the lead up to the passage through Parliament of ATA 
(No. 2) in late 2005 had commented that this new piece of anti-terrorism legislation 
„did not go far enough‟. He had also recommended even stronger powers than those 
proposed in ATA (No. 2) including „allowing police to lock down entire suburbs and 
carry out house, vehicle and people searches without judicial approval.‟59 In another 
hopeful sign that in fighting the war against terrorism the new Government is to some 
extent distancing itself from the approach taken by its predecessor (and that of the 
former Opposition Leader), the new Foreign Minister Stephen Smith has recently 
endorsed an international campaign, supported by the Law Council of Australia and 
the Australian Bar Association, to close the US prison holding terrorist suspects at 
Guantanamo Bay. Similar organisations in Britain, Canada, France and Germany are 
also supporting the campaign.   
 
Conclusion 
After September 11, 2001 the former Australian Government introduced a whole raft 
of anti-terrorism legislation which it claimed was needed to protect the country and its 
citizens from terrorist attack. This legislation includes the ASIO Act and the ATA (No. 
2) both of which contain exceptional measures diluting or removing established rights 
and liberties and seriously weakening the rule of law. They thus fail a crucial test 
when the notion of national security is extended beyond the narrow, conventional 
view which holds that national security is based on the security and liberty of the 
person from criminal and violent acts including terrorism. On this view, sometimes 
the defence of national security requires human rights and the Rule of Lawto be 
relegated to a much lower priority. This can lead to the privileging of state security 
over the security and liberty of the person. When the conventional view is widened to 
encompass the security and liberty of the person from the arbitrary exercise or abuse 
of state power the anti-terrorism legislation clearly does not protect Australia‟s 
national security and even effectively undermines it. The absence of a Bill or Charter 
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of Rights has left Australians highly vulnerable to arbitrary and excessive state 
power. Not only is such an instrument urgently required, so also but even more 
fundamentally is a new conception of national security that will help to ensure that the 
country‟s national security is fully protected in the age of terror. A conception of 
national security which includes the security and liberty of the person from terrorist 
attack and from state repression as two of its indivisible and absolutely equal aspects 
would go a long way to providing such protection. 
 
It is unfortunate that the former Shadow Homeland Security Minister and the current 
Attorney-General made no mention in their addresses of the need in the war against 
terrorism (and more generally) for human rights protections for Australian citizens, 
and residents, such as would be afforded by a Bill or Charter of Rights. It is also not 
clear whether their remarks about ensuring that the anti-terrorism laws do not 
undermine the very freedoms they seek to defend, and on the need for justice, the 
rule of law, inclusive development and so on are anything more than populist 
rhetoric. In any event, without a Bill or Charter of Rights to give them meaning and 
substance such remarks are likely to remain rhetorical, even if they are well-
intentioned and sincerely expressed. The failure to include an assurance that an 
unclassified version of the homeland and border security review would be produced 
is a worrying sign that secrecy and suspicion are just as much part of the new 
Government‟s approach to fighting the war against terrorism as it was of the previous 
Government‟s. There is little hope of having a better informed public, and a better 
informed and more sober public debate about the threat of terrorism and how it might 
most effectively be met, if the Government continues to treat the public with suspicion 
and distrust and does not even allow it to have access to an unclassified, and 
therefore incomplete or bowdlerised, version of the review. It seems, then, that a new 
conception of national security which includes the security and liberty of the person 
from terrorist attack and from state repression as its two indivisible and absolutely 
equal aspects is still a long way off. Indeed, it has not yet even appeared on the 
horizon of law making in Australia. 
 
